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Summary
From 1950, a lot of researchers try to understand what is policy, how to define 
it and what kind of knowledge we can produce about it. When Harold Lass-
well in 1942 proposed to develop the policy science, he established a strong 
connection between the development of policy sciences and democracy. He 
deemed that there was a complementary relationship between knowing policy 
and the political system. With policy analysis at the end of the century, two 
kinds of knowledge have been developed. First, knowledge about the sub-
stance of policy, the different kind of instruments which compose it, their ef-
fects, meaning and goals. Second, knowledge of the policy process, to under-
stand how and why policy changes. Each knowledge has its own dynamics. 
But the problem is always the difficulty to link the two kinds of knowledge: 
knowledge of instrument analysis and knowledge of policy dynamics analy-
sis. We can choose between work which understands the substance of policy 
but does not examine policy dynamics, and work about policy dynamics that 
does not take into account the specific substance of policy. Finally, a lot of re-
searchers who produce knowledge of instruments never understand why their 
knowledge has so little influence. The paper aims to review the complex re-
lationship between knowledge of instruments and knowledge of policy dyna-
mics, and proposes to open a new way by considering the role of knowledge 
of instruments inside policy dynamics. The main idea is to focus on the dis-
cursive process of actors who transform instruments into policy by making 
sense of the instruments, and to illustrate this by some empirical examples. 
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Since the middle of the 20th century, researchers have been investigating different 
questions about policy and contributing to the development of the scientific disci-
pline of policy analysis (Peters and Pierre, 2006; Parsons, 2003; Moran et al., 2008; 
DeLeon, 1997). But since the founding of the discipline, researchers have been de-
veloping knowledge in two very different ways. 
First, some researchers work on the substance of policy and consider policy 
analysis as consisting of the identification of different kinds of instruments that 
comprise policy, their effects, their meaning, and their goals. In this category, one 
can find contributions to policy studies that seek to clarify the ends, to understand 
problems, to inventory means, to identify consequences, and to track the realization 
of policy goals. Analyzing policy consists of helping participants to define metho-
dological approaches to solving problems. 
Second, other researchers focus on the policy process. The main idea is to ob-
serve the empirical dynamics of policy and to model it. The work of researchers 
who study the policy process is more descriptive and their analysis consists of iso-
lating some variables, like interest, ideas, and institutions, in an effort to identify 
causal links between them. A lot of research, in this case, uses the positivist method 
inspired by natural science to grasp the policy process. The incrementalism model 
was probably one of the first models that corresponded to this kind of analysis. 
But the problem is always the difficulty in linking the two kinds of know-
ledge: knowledge about instruments and knowledge about policy dynamics. We 
can choose between work which understands the substance of policy but does not 
examine policy dynamics, and work about policy dynamics that does not take into 
account the specific substance of policy. Paradoxically, on the one hand, research-
ers use the knowledge of policy substance in a prescriptive way to influence the 
process by proposing new arguments. On the other hand, researchers use the know-
ledge of the policymaking process in a prospective way, and never consider that 
any prescriptive argumentation process could influence the determinist orientation 
of policy dynamics. 
This article aims to review the complex relationship between knowledge of 
instruments and knowledge of policy dynamics and to propose a new direction by 
considering the fundamental role of knowledge of instruments inside policy dyna-
mics. The main idea is to focus on the discursive practices of policymakers who 
transform instruments into policies by making sense of the instruments, using this 
sense to convince each other and build coalitions, and, finally, use coalitions to le-
gitimate power and impose decisions. 
In the first part of this paper, we focus on policy analysis as a scientific disci-
pline which produces knowledge on policy substance in a prescriptive way. In the 
second part, we describe policy analysis of policy dynamics in a prospective way. 
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In these two parts, we invoke the work of some classical policy analysts in order to 
grasp the two approaches. In the third part, we show how the two kinds of know-
ledge are not compatible, and in the fourth part, we endeavor to open a new way of 
reconciling these two areas of knowledge. In the two last parts, we use an empiri-
cal case, the policymaking process with regard to the Parisian tramway, to help us 
demonstrate our arguments. 
Policy Analysis as Prescriptive Knowledge on Policy Substance
As we explained in the introduction, there are two kinds of policy analysis. As sug-
gested by Charles Lindblom, we can say that there is analysis for the policy process 
and analysis on the policy process. 
In the first case, we find different studies that can help the policy process by 
producing scientific recommendations (Lindblom, 1980). The main idea of this 
kind of work is generally to undress policy by removing values, goals, and ideology 
until a neutral instrument is found that can then be considered by researchers. The 
researchers’ work consists of separating facts from values, means from ends, goals 
from alternatives, output from outcome, consequences from effects, and to define 
policy as an assembly of all these components. For example, knowledge production 
about housing policy is equivalent to identifying all the instruments that the go-
vernment can use and, for each instrument, selecting the corresponding goals, con-
sequences, values, and ideologies. 
Producing specific knowledge on policy is not really new. A lot of research-
ers think that this is very important, as producing policy knowledge enables poli-
cymakers to make good decisions. Alexis de Tocqueville studied prison policy in 
the United States (Beaumont de La Bonniniére and Tocqueville, 1833) to produce 
knowledge on this kind of policy and enlighten France to ameliorate its own poli-
cy. Charles Merriam studied policy against crime for the municipality of Chicago 
(Merriam, 1915). Eugene Schattschneider analyzed tariff policy (Schattschneider, 
1974). Harold Lasswell aimed to develop a policy science, which acts as “medi-
cine” and attempts to help solve problems (Lerner and Lasswell, 1951; Arens and 
Lasswell, 1961). Thus, policy analysts serve as advisors to policymakers. 
We cannot, however, understand the development of the advice aspect of poli-
cy analysis without showing interest in the complex relationship between this new 
discipline and the success of the rational choice paradigm. Since the 1950s, some 
economists and political scientists have been investigating new methods of solving 
problems. In the 1960s and the 1970s, PPBS (Planning Programming Budgeting 
System), building on the rational choice paradigm, was successful in the American 
system (Wildavsky, 1969; Botner, 1970). The main idea of PPBS was to transform 
policy into goals, alternatives and consequences, and to design a rational process 
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for hierarchically organizing choices by using a common value to compare cost and 
performance at the same time. 
Contesting the success of this economic and quantitative paradigm, different 
authors pointed out the limitations of PPBS and tried to prove that there was a way 
of doing “real” policy analysis that was more qualitative and took into account the 
complexity of specific situations and the political aspects of the decision-making 
process. For political scientists, the proposed rational and methodological approach 
to knowledge raised two problems: the disappearance of politics from the forefront 
of rationality and the gap between theoretical models and “real” empirical situa-
tions.
Aaron Wildavsky is one of the most important contributors to this movement. 
At the end of the 1960s, following Lindblom’s paradigm, he wrote several articles 
in which he explained how PPBS is a problematic approach, and argued for another 
possible way – “policy analysis” (Wildavsky, 1964, 1969). Wildavsky developed 
an important critique of PPBS. First, he considered policy analysis not only incapa-
ble of nullifying political aspects, but able to proceed only after the prior establish-
ment of political choices. Similar to other authors, like David Easton or Yehezkel 
Dror (Easton, 1965a; Dror, 1968), Wildavsky criticized the idea that policy is only 
factual and considered rationality, as well as integrated values and primary objec-
tives, to be aspects of policy that only politicians can prioritize. Choosing between 
health goals and educational goals for children, for example, is rationally impos-
sible. So, the main idea of Wildavsky is to reintegrate the question of values into 
policy analysis and abandon the idea that policy analysis is slowed by politics. Con-
trary to what PPBS experts think, Wildavsky argued that policy analysis follows 
political choice. 
If Wildavsky aimed to take into account values and politics, he would have 
considered them as two distinct concepts separated by a clear boundary. This dis-
tinction allows for a clear separation and identification of the respective roles of 
politicians and policy analysts. The policy analyst, in Wildavsky’s perspective, 
must produce knowledge about facts after the values are chosen by politics. His job 
consists of illuminating choice by producing information about means and ends – 
to clarify goals and engage a strategic process in which policy objectives are the 
reference point. 
The second aspect of PPBS that Wildavsky criticized is its inability to achieve 
its objective. Returning to Lindblom’s and Simon’s remarks about the synoptic and 
rational approaches, Wildavsky showed how this kind of analysis is impossible: it 
would be impossible to rigorously evaluate the amount of data and make all the ne-
cessary calculations, the consequences of alternatives would be difficult to esti-
mate, the objective would always be difficult to specify, and the ability to draw a 
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comparison would be compromised by both the difficulty of collecting data and the 
varied types of – often not even comparable – data that exist.
Wildavsky criticized the rational choice paradigm, which aims to produce ab-
solute knowledge as a substitution for politics. In PPBS, politics and knowledge are 
contradictory. In policy analysis, politics and knowledge are complementary. The 
condition of this complementarity is the capacity to mark a clear boundary between 
facts and values and to center the production of knowledge around facts. 
Finally, Wildavsky wanted to produce a policy analysis that continued to be 
scientific but different from rational choice by taking values, political aspects, and 
the complexity of reality into greater account. But, similar to other researchers who 
wanted to distance themselves from rational choice, he faced real difficulty in de-
fining a scientific position. 
If this kind of work produced normative knowledge that influenced the policy 
process, then there would be difficulties with respect to producing effects. A lot of 
researchers want to tell “the truth” to politicians, but it is difficult to persuade them 
of such truth. This process of producing knowledge consists of considering that sci-
ence produces and tells the truth, and politics can only fabricate such truth if the 
scientific recommendation is not followed. The main operation is to create a theo-
retical and normative point of view. 
Policy Analysis as Predictive Knowledge on the Policy Process
If the first kind of work is to produce knowledge for the policy process without ef-
fect, the second kind of work studies the policy process itself. The scientific process 
is more empirical. Researchers try to understand the process of policy change by 
identifying some variables that provoked the change and by examining the relation-
ship between these variables inside a model describing a dynamic movement. 
In policy analysis studies, we can identify and also subsume different kinds 
of models. Each model implies the transformation of policy into an object inside 
a change process and the identification of certain, possibly causal, variables. Each 
model represents a different way of grasping the policy process. 
The first model is the stage approach. In this model, the main idea is that policy 
change is the result of a succession of stages (Hupe and Hill, 2006). Generally, the 
first step identifies the agenda-setting problem, and the last step decides the policy 
change and implementation. Each stage has a rational link to the previous one. In 
this case, the main causality of policy change is the appearance of a new problem 
or the definition of a new objective. Dividing the policy change process into differ-
ent stages allows for the ordering of reality and highlights the change process more 
clearly. Every author that tries to develop this stage approach constantly oscillates 
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between two positions: on the one hand, viewing the stage model as a descriptive 
model of the policy process and, on the other hand, recommending the stage model 
as a heuristic method for analyzing policy – which is actually the third category of 
policy analysis. In our point of view, this oscillation corresponds to the difficulty of 
confining empirical reality to a model. 
Herbert Simon provided a good example of these difficulties. In Administrative 
Behavior (1947), Simon explained how the complexity of the environment, the un-
certainty of the future, and the limited capacity of human thinking combine to make 
any objective and rational method of choosing the best problem-solving instrument 
impossible. He developed a demonstration by contradiction, showing that no reali-
ty can correspond to the rational process. Rationality, he observed, is always sub-
jective, contingent, and bounded. Throughout his life, he tried to find a model for 
grasping human rationality. If no reality corresponds to a rational model, the prob-
lem is that, as Kenneth Arrow explained, no theory corresponds to reality: 
The problem with accepting the hypothesis of bounded rationality is not its reality 
but its adequacy as a theory. I’m sufficiently an old-fashioned positivist (as was 
Herbert Simon) to hold that a theory that cannot be falsified is no theory. The gap 
is filled in practice by specific hypotheses about the particular form the bounds 
on rationality take in different contexts. But there is no general criterion for de-
termining which limit on rationality holds in any given context and therefore the 
building of a complete theory of the economy on the basis of bounded rationality 
is a project for the future. (...) I conclude, though tentatively, that this project is not 
successful. (Arrow, 2004: 54)
In another way, Harold Lasswell tried to find a model to describe the reality 
of the policy process (Lasswell, 1956, 1970). With the concept of the policy cycle, 
Lasswell developed the idea that we can define seven stages of the decision pro-
cess: intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, 
and termination. In his work, Lasswell presented two kinds of models: the first is 
a descriptive model in which each stage follows the last one. The second is a pre-
scriptive model in which Lasswell explained the importance of following this cy-
cle for amelioration of the policy process. There is a contradiction between the two 
kinds of models. If it is a descriptive case, Lasswell does not recommend following 
the model. If it is a prescriptive case, Lasswell cannot explain that reality follows 
the model. Sometimes he argued that this cycle was heuristic, and at other times a 
model of reality. 
Many authors, such as Charles Jones, Charles Anderson and Robert Mack 
(Jones, 1970; Anderson, 1975; Mack, 1971), have encountered the same difficul-
ties. When they presented their model, they always oscillated between a descriptive 
and a heuristic model for ordering reality. 
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The second model is dynamic or incremental. With the incrementalist ap-
proach, Charles Lindblom opened a new way to analyzing policy change (Lind-
blom, 1958a, 1958b). The main difference between this approach and the previous 
model is that the main variable with which to understand policy change is not the 
agenda-setting problem, but the previous policy. The object “policy” has its own 
motion and we can use the concept of “dynamics” to underline this autonomous 
move. Incrementalism is a dynamic process, which considers that policy feedback 
is the first constraint for policy change. This approach also takes into account his-
torical neo-institutionalism and path dependency. 
Following Herbert Simon’s hypothesis about bounded rationality, Charles 
Lindblom suggested that, in order to get around the difficulties of rational objecti-
vity and the synoptic model, actors develop cognitive strategies to simplify reality 
and solve problems (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963). This hypothesis is derived 
from observing reality, and Lindblom suggested that in most cases participants are 
“muddling through” when they propose policy. Thus, Lindblom not only describes 
the reality of “muddling through”, but also suggests a rigorous method for taking it 
into account: the “science of muddling through”. Here, science is not just a descrip-
tion, but also a prescription for going through reality. Lindblom had real difficul-
ties being understood and he continued, twenty years after the first article, to try to 
clarify and correct these misunderstandings (Lindblom, 1979). The difficulty comes 
from a double paradox: if “muddling through” is the reality of participants and the 
synoptic model a simple illusion, why did Lindblom continue to fight against it and 
regret its success? If “muddling through” is the inescapable reality, how could Lind-
blom suggest a specific way of escaping it? 
More generally, Eugene Bardach considered that a certain dynamics begins 
when a policy system’s output becomes its input (Bardach, 2006). Hence, in dy-
namic approaches, the irregularity of the movement as a variation of policy change 
disappeared. 
The third model is a mix of the stage and dynamic approaches. David Easton 
was one of the first authors to develop this mixed model. Easton began by consider-
ing all political interactions as a behavior system (Easton, 1965a, 1965b). Accord-
ing to him, the political system is made up of complex interactions that must react to 
a lot of perturbations. He rejected the hypothesis that actors in the political system 
seek to produce or return to “equilibrium”, and rather advocated understanding the 
system as being in perpetual motion. 
Easton imagined two kinds of “perturbations”. The first perturbation comes 
from society and other systems. Easton’s description of this perturbation is very 
close to that of the agenda-setting process. He considered that a problem comes 
from a collective group who can formulate a problem. He insisted that formulating 
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a problem is not enough. The problem needs to be translated into an issue that par-
ticipants believe can be solved by a public authority. But this collective demand is 
not enough to stress the system. The collective group needs to amass enough sup-
port to intensify their problem. In a certain way, the demand is the substance of the 
stress, and the support is its intensity. Hence, David Easton insisted on the role of 
the “spokesperson” for translating the problem and aggregating enough actors.
According to this argument, the first kind of input can be compared to the stage 
approach, because the input is the cause of the system’s perturbation leading to an 
outcome which is usually a policy. But Easton’s main idea is to combine this first 
kind of perturbation with another kind: the feedback from the outcome. Because he 
refused the idea of returning to equilibrium, we can consider the system to be dy-
namic. 
The punctuated equilibrium model from Jones and Baumgartner also tries 
to combine the agenda-setting process and the feedback effect (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1991). Their primary goal is to explain why policies are stable most of the 
time. They argue that: 
[P]olicy stability is a function of two distinct sources. The first is ‘friction’ in the 
‘rules of games’ that make it difficult to take place in political system. The formal 
rules that govern policy require a great deal of energy to overcome. (...) The se-
cond source of stability may be found in the cognitive and emotional constraints 
of political actors – the bounds of their rationality. (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 
XXIII) 
Thus, the work of the two authors is very similar to the incrementalist ap-
proach, which understands policy changes as marginal and taking place within a 
stable system. This stability is produced by the presence of fixed institutions and 
policy monopoly, which are “structural arrangements that are supported by power-
ful ideas” (ibid.: 4).
Nevertheless, the most original aspect of the punctuated equilibrium sys-
tem has to do with its capacity to mix this stable system with the stage approach, 
whereby specific attention to a problem may suddenly cause a significant change 
and destabilize the otherwise stable system. Studying the agenda-setting process, 
Baumgartner and Jones suggested that attention to a problem in the political arena 
provides an opportunity for observing controversies between old and new ideas, 
and sometimes for modifying institutions, ideas, and actors’ powers inside a policy 
subsystem. “In the end, we depict a political system that displays considerable sta-
bility with regard to the manner in which processes issue, but this stability is punc-
tuated with periods of volatile change” (ibid.).
Mixing the two models, as Easton and Baumgartner and Jones have done, does 
not serve to solve the difficulties posed by each model. Firstly, these scholars, if they 
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are to build a model, always need to objectify policy and transform it into an object 
in repetitive motion. If Easton had tried to take into account the political question by 
taking into account the importance of the “political system”, he would have needed 
to preserve the boundary between policy and politics as means and ends, and thus 
he would have faced the same difficulty in confining cases to the model. 
The fourth model is the random model. This model was developed by Cohen, 
March, and Olsen (Cohen et al., 1972) to study decision-making processes, and 
was imported into policy analysis by John Kingdon (Kingdon, 1995). The model 
is based on the hypothesis that there are independent movements between four in-
dependent streams: problems, solutions, energy from participants, and choice. To 
understand the decision-making process, Cohen, March and Olsen suggested con-
sidering the fact that each stream looks for another, albeit not in a rational manner. 
In this model, there are a “collection of choices looking for problems, issues and 
feelings looking for decision situations in which they can be aired, solutions look-
ing for issues to which they might be an answer and decision makers looking for a 
work” (Cohen et al., 1972: 294). This allows them to break with the rational idea 
that solutions come from problem-solving activities or from the dynamics of the 
decision. Their complex model supposes that the four streams are in such a phase 
as to allow a decision. 
Based on empirical case studies, e.g. inside universities, the random model 
shows how the previous models are wrong in some situations, especially when they 
try to see policy change as the outcome of a problem or a specific feedback. These 
studies aim to highlight specific cases in which there are problematic preferences, 
unclear technology, and fluid participation. As John Kingdon explained (Kingdon, 
1995), a lot of decisions inside the process of changing public policy correspond to 
this kind of situation, thus signifying that a lot of policy decisions are not predict-
able and depend on the random meeting of the above-mentioned streams. 
It is interesting to note how these four kinds of models propose contradictory 
explanations. A particularly easy way to understand this is to consider that each ap-
proach corresponds to specific situations. In this way, we forget the universal vo-
cation of the process of modeling. For example, if we consider the link between a 
problem and a solution in the policy process, each approach suggests a different 
way of conceptualizing it. For some, the solution comes from the problem itself, 
while for others it does not. No model or meta-model has the capacity to explain 
two cases. In reality, the different models are contradictory and each one shows how 
the others do not take into account some aspects. 
Beyond the contradiction, apart from the random model, these different ap-
proaches have several common points which can explain their failure to describe 
reality. First of all, these models try to transform a chaotic, specific, and com-
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plex reality into an ordered and universal world. Second, all these approaches are 
based on the separation of facts from values, policy from politics, and object from 
subject. The process of modeling needs to identify universal objects and regu-
lar transitions. Third, all these approaches exclude the specificity of participants, 
meaning, for example, the influence of their arguments, their knowledge, and their 
discourse. 
Only the random model takes into account some specific and contingent ele-
ments, like the spirit of participants, the specificity of the decision, and the specific 
process whereby a solution seeks an issue. As John Kingdon explained in the se-
cond edition of his book, the limitation of this model has to do with the emphasis 
placed on opportunities and randomness, which Kingdon found to be insufficient as 
explanations of policy change.
From the Paradox of the Science of “Muddling Through”...
On the one hand, researchers try to produce knowledge on policy and to transform 
this knowledge into arguments to influence policymakers. On the other hand, when 
researchers examine the policy change process, they neither consider knowledge or 
argument as a causality of policy change. 
The main problem comes from a paradox of reconciling the two approaches. In 
order to consider the possible impact of scientific advice on policymakers, research-
ers must consider that the argumentative process can, in general, have an impact on 
policy. If scientific advice can influence policy, why can policy not be influenced 
by the advice of an expert, politician, or bureaucrat? But if everyone can influence 
a process and if policy change depends on the number of influential participants as 
well as the efficiency of arguments, how is it possible to grasp a model which needs 
regularity? In other words, researchers who subscribe to the first kind of policy 
analysis need to be aware of the limitations of models that do not take into account 
the ways actors influence policy. 
This impossibility of reconciling the two approaches comes from three find-
ings. First, policy analysis as knowledge for the policy process is not a science. A 
lot of authors remark that analyzing policy is never really rigorous and scientific, 
as policymaking participants have difficulty doing anything apart from “muddling 
through” or “crafting”. Lindblom, for example, explains that this kind of know-
ledge, whether produced by scientist or other participants, is always a “muddling 
through”. Wildavsky, after looking for a definition of policy analysis, concluded 
that policy analysis is more a craft than a science (Wildavsky, 1987). 
Second, if knowledge on policy is not a science, the scientist does not have any 
superiority or specificity over the knowledge of laymen. The problem of scientists 
who investigate this knowledge-making process lies in differentiating their know-
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ledge from the knowledge of the participants. Policy analysis is nothing more than 
the traditional language used by participants. 
Third, policy analysis as knowledge about the process cannot be determinist 
and positivist. Because the knowledge of participants is a “craft” and because there 
are many subjective ways to determine the participants’ choice, the process cannot 
be modeled as a dynamic process in which policy is treated as an object. All the 
models suppose that participants cannot display specific behavior or surprising in-
fluence on the process. 
To understand this impossibility, we must take an empirical example. The 
French housing policy is considered by actors to be a very complex domain that 
only a few actors can understand (Zittoun, 2000, 2001). These experts come from 
bureaucracy, politics, science, and interest groups. It is not epistemologically pos-
sible to distinguish policy analysts from this different group of actors. To evaluate 
instruments of policy, all actors use the same kind of process – they do what they 
can to identify goals, alternatives, and consequences to compare different instru-
ments. In 1977, there was a really important controversy over the housing policy 
between actors who defended a specific instrument to finance the construction of 
government-funded housing, and another instrument to directly finance assistance 
to people to rent housing. Each instrument had its own advocacy coalition that sup-
ported it and we find different kinds of actors inside each coalition, each of which 
had a repertoire of arguments that are impossible to compare objectively. 
Another example is derived from an empirical study of the tramway in Pa-
ris (Zittoun, 2007, 2008). There was an important controversy between traditional 
transport economists, who developed a specific position to defend one layout, and 
planners who defended another layout. 
In the first case, knowledge production began by transforming each layout into 
a series of indicators. The experts produced a list of crucial variables, i.e. those se-
lected indicators that allowed the projects to be quantified, and thus compared, so 
that they could be seen as “alternative” responses to the same problem. The figures 
given in this table are based on technological transport engineering models com-
pared using an expert system (Giddens, 1994), the application of which involves 
making assumptions and reducing uncertainties. Nine variables were selected, and 
they had to be simultaneously manipulated. The length of the line was a basic pa-
rameter, of course, but also the population served and the expected number of morn-
ing rush-hour users. Each variable involved calculations, assumptions, and more or 
less complex choices; for instance, the idea of a “working population within 600 
meters of a station” was based on an assumption about the potential pool of transit 
riders. This gave a figure of 240,000-250,000. Then, using a process which reduced 
levels of uncertainty about future behavior, the “population” was converted into a 
“total number of users during the morning rush hour”.
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The job of the transport experts was to define a problem, to express it in fi-
gures, and to connect the result to plans that could be compared on a hierarchical 
basis. This led to the creation of a “public” consisting of people “who want to go as 
fast as possible”, with a relationship between this public and the physical integra-
tion of a tram system into a territory. This relationship was merged by means of a 
rationalization which offered neither a space of discussion nor a method of negotia-
tion. “The figures cannot be distorted. Even someone who knows very little about 
transport can see that one system will work better than another. After that – well, 
it’s up to the politicians.”1
In the second case, urban planners were particularly keen on a “2-in-1” project. 
The “indicators” had rendered the projects comparable, as we have seen, but the 
contributions of urban-planning experts shed new light on the question. To the “per-
formance” dimension of transport they added the urban dimension of a tramway as 
something which was not simply a means of transport, but which also modified and 
transformed the urban fabric. The experts recalled that the peripheral railway line 
occupied a separate territory and that to install a tramway there would not modify 
the urban landscape as such. This non-urban character of the proposal, which was 
regarded as a considerable asset by the transport experts (for whom speed was the 
paramount consideration), was viewed as a handicap by the town planners. In other 
words, the performance criteria which made it possible to compare the two propo-
sals were now compounded by urban problems which disqualified one of the two.
The two positions look like two different kinds of policy analysis that mixed 
scientific method and technical device to grasp the different instruments. Each 
method arrived at a different conclusion and each method appeared like a rigorous 
method and scientific paradigm. But when we observe the method of building this 
knowledge, it suggests a process similar to that of “muddling through”. 
... to the Science of the Craft of Muddling Through and the Spread 
of a Policy Statement
To escape this paradox, we propose a different scientific way to reconcile the two 
kinds of knowledge. Our understanding of the policymaking process requires shift-
ing our attention to the subjective knowledge process. We propose taking into ac-
count the influence of knowledge produced during the policy process – knowledge 
that is produced through the process of “muddling through” by participants. 
More precisely, we suggest three central hypotheses to structure an approach 
which takes the question of knowledge, and the discourse that carries it, seriously. 
With these hypotheses, we want to follow recent post-positivist approaches (Fischer 
1 Interview with an official of the RATP.
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and Forester, 1993; Yanow, 1996; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Zittoun, 2009; Hajer 
and Laws, 2006; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003). First, the participants need to produce 
their own policy analysis to grasp instruments and transform them into policy state-
ments. Second, this process of deriving meaning is the key to understanding the de-
velopment of advocacy coalitions around policy statements and the strategies used 
by participants. Three, this process needs to be considered as a political process 
to legitimate a government and order society. In this way, we propose understand-
ing the policymaking process through the observation of the game of language, the 
game of actors, and the game of power, all of which work together. 
First, we must be attentive to the empirical meaning process in which par-
ticipants speak about instruments and make sense of them. As Wittgenstein sug-
gests, the process of deriving meaning comes from the game of language that we 
use (Wittgenstein, 2005). The production of categories and links between different 
statements is not imposed by reality, but is rather built inside the discourse to pro-
duce meaning, or sense (Douglas, 2004). The first function of language is to carry 
knowledge and to be the site in which we try to order and put together ideas to pro-
duce sense. 
One of the most common ways to produce meaning with an instrument is to 
produce a causal link between it and a problem. For a lot of authors, the question 
of this link is difficult. For some authors, like Simon and Lindblom, the solution is 
the result of muddling through the problem-solving cognitive method. For other au-
thors, like Cohen, March and Olsen or Kingdon, the solution to a problem emerges 
through luck and opportunity (Kingdon, 2002; Cohen et al., 1972). Nonetheless, if 
the solution does not require a problem to exist and be formulated, why does a so-
lution continue to necessitate the identification of a problem? Why do participants 
formulate a solution without the existence of a problem? Kingdon and others never 
address this question. 
A policy instrument can be perceived as problem-solving. If the linking pro-
cess is not objectively rational, then one has to observe the efforts made by partici-
pants to demonstrate to others, as well as to themselves, that a specific solution is 
appropriate. In other words, if the problem and the solution are independent, we can 
suppose that participants need to glue both of these together using some convin-
cing argument. 
For example, let’s return to the tramway case. There are different ways to make 
sense of the tramway. In the first case, with the transport economy, the tramway be-
came the solution to a transport problem. In the second case, with the urban plan-
ners, the tramway became the solution to an urban problem of a neighborhood in 
Paris. To link one problem to one solution, the participants needed to merge the two 
aspects into a single statement and develop arguments to prove this link.
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Intuitively, we can say that the tramway was the solution to the two problems, 
but in this case each manner of linking the two had a cost and produced a different 
result. In the first case, the transport economy produced indicators to determine the 
“best” way between the two layouts. In the second case, urban planners produced 
an analysis to distinguish the two layouts and to choose the one that resolved the 
urban problem.
Second, the game of language is not only interesting in terms of observing the 
process of knowledge production, but also in observing the game of actors, in which 
the actors develop argumentative strategies to persuade others and build coalitions 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958; Fischer, 2003). Discourse is not only a frame-
work of knowledge, but also a means to structure interaction between actors. We 
speak about discursive practices to suggest that the discourse empirically exists only 
inside interactive practice (Mead et al., 2006). A discourse is carried by a speaker to 
an audience in a specific time-space and expresses an intention, the intention of the 
speaker, which can have an effect that is not necessarily reflective of the intention. In 
this idea, discursive practice is an action and an interaction. With the concept of dis-
cursive practices, we refute the separation between discourse and practice delineated 
by researchers who produce semantic analyses, and thus seek to separate discourse 
from practice in an effort to study only the discourse – even the researchers who want 
to study the practice behind the discourse, which bears little significance. 
With respect to the policymaking process, we aim to develop the hypothesis 
that the only way to disseminate a policy statement is through direct contact, discus-
sions, and the persuasion process. We do not suppose that every participant wakes 
up on the same morning with the same proposition, but rather consider that each 
policymaker needs to be convinced by a policy statement before appropriating it. 
This hypothesis reinforces the role of sense in constructing and debating policy in-
struments. How can one communicate an idea about a policy instrument without 
first making sense of it? Explaining that an instrument is the solution to a problem 
helps to convince an audience. 
Let’s return to the tramway. To understand the policymaking process, we must 
examine how instruments are initiated. In the beginning, only very few actors de-
fended the idea of a tramway in both the first and second layouts. The most common 
point of view was not to oppose the tramway – it was disinterest in the tramway. 
The task of each group was to interest other actors in taking their position. 
The persuasion process consists not only of changing the point of view of the 
others, but also of identifying specific arguments that could influence other actors. 
There are those scientific and technical arguments designed to convince others of 
the validity of the statement, i.e. that an instrument is the solution to a problem, and 
there are also interesting arguments whereby speakers explain to an audience how 
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the appropriation corresponds to their interest. A discussion is like a truth and iden-
tity trial. 
What is really interesting in the tramway case is that the two positions were 
present inside each institution. The two points of view existed inside the municipa-
lity of Paris, RATP (the organization that manages the subway), the state, the Urban 
Agency of Paris (APUR), the users association, etc. So the participants organized 
their strategy to choose arguments and opted to adjust the policy statement to take 
into account the views of the audience. The persuasion process is a process of ap-
propriation that allows each actor to mark his footprint inside the policy statement. 
Following the dissemination and adjustment of a policy statement, the state-
ment serves to link policymakers and initiate coalition-building. The policy state-
ment binds the actors to each other inside a coalition, and the coalition helps to con-
solidate the policy statement and make it credible. 
Third, the policymaking process is not always a game of language and a game 
of actors, but also a game of power (Foucault, 1966, 1971). The question of power is 
the most difficult question for those who try to take discourse seriously. For a long 
time, researchers who took discourse seriously did not consider the inequalities be-
tween policymakers, and researchers who took these inequalities seriously did not 
consider discourse as having any importance. It is one of Pierre Bourdieu’s most im-
portant critiques of discursive approaches (Bourdieu, 2001). He defends the idea that 
researchers forget that not everyone enjoys the right to speak and to be considered. 
For him, discourse is only a weapon for actors who have a dominant position. 
We would like to reconcile the question of power by taking into account the 
remarks of Pierre Bourdieu. To understand the persuasion process, we must under-
stand who the speaker wants to convince when he arrives at a meeting with his au-
dience and if his audience takes him seriously. With regard to this, we defend the 
idea that every participant who wants to persuade an actor builds not only an argu-
ment, but also a power map to identify who he must necessarily convince in order 
to advance his argument. 
For example, a lot of actors in the first part of the tramway decision-making 
process tried to convince the mayor to choose the “good” layout. They recognized 
the influential power of the mayor, even though the mayor did not really have the 
power to decide. Some actors in RATP developed a strategy to convince the direc-
tor of RATP, who was able to influence the mayor. Each actor designed his own 
map detailing the positions of powerful and less powerful actors in order to choose 
whom to convince. When the mayor chose one layout and joined the respective coa-
lition, the other coalition tried not only to pressure the mayor to change his position, 
but also to convince other policymakers who participated in the decision-making 
process to change their respective position(s). The mapping of relative power posi-
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tions was based on subjective knowledge and had an impact both before and during 
the discussion, thereby accentuating the credibility of the argument. 
The other interesting aspect of this question of power was the process of le-
gitimization associated with the tramway. Through their support of the tramway, 
advocates were able to project their own legitimacy. For example, when the mayor 
defended the tramway project, he defended the legitimacy of the mayor to impose 
the tramway. The tramway and the mayor are associated in a game of power. Spe-
cifically, when the mayor hesitated to choose between the two layouts, a sense of 
conflict emerged because the lack of progress on the tramway project symbolized 
the incapacity of the mayor to govern. What is important is not whether the tram-
way was just an excuse to critique the political process, but rather to understand that 
the tramway was the means to address the question of governance. 
In sum, the main idea was to focus observation on the discursive practices 
of the policymakers in order to understand how instruments make sense as policy 
statements, how a policy statement becomes a means to bind actors together inside 
a coalition, and how the development and stability of a coalition work together to 
enforce an instrument as a new decision. 
Conclusion: Observing the Policymakers’ Analysis 
to Understand the Policymaking Process
The status of policy analysis is ambiguous. For some researchers, it is just a dis-
cipline that produces knowledge on policy and, in a prescriptive way, transforms 
it into an argument to tell the truth to politicians. After finding the missing impact 
of their knowledge, those researchers discover in practice, against their will, that 
knowledge cannot be disassociated from the actors who carry it and can have no 
influence if the actors do not play three games: the game of language, the game of 
actors, and the game of power. Curiously, those researchers never take this reality 
into account. When they try to describe the policy process, they never acknowledge 
any influence of knowledge and of the argumentative process. The same research-
ers can propose a new instrument as a radical change, and describe path dependency 
as demonstrating the impossibility for participants to have a real influence on the 
policy process, except marginally. In this way, policy analysis as the discipline that 
describes the policy process consequentially transforms policy into an object, and 
it proceeds as a regular phenomenon without the direct influence of participants or 
context. It is a predictive way that generally functions only after policy change. 
We suggest transforming policy analysis as a political science to observe the 
specific process of policymaking, thereby understanding the role of knowledge and 
subjective understanding and analyzing the strategies of policymakers inside the 
three games. In such a case, researchers would not analyze the substance of policy, 
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but would rather observe the means that policymakers use to give sense, or mean-
ing, to policy. Furthermore, researchers would not consider the dynamics of policy, 
but would rather be interested in the way the policymakers try to grasp the dyna-
mics and use it. 
The policymaking process is a subjective and contingent process. Policy analy-
sis as a descriptive science cannot be transformed into a prescriptive or a predictive 
approach. So what can we use policy analysis for? We would like to develop a main 
hypothesis based on the idea that the success or failure of a policymaking state-
ment and the building of coalitions are good ways to understand politics in society. 
Policy statements must be understood as an approach by policymakers to solving 
problems, and further demonstrate that political will addresses social issues and 
problems, thereby reordering society. Policy statements link not only problems and 
solutions and actors and coalitions, but also order and disorder in society, which is 
a specific political phenomenon. 
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